Abstract-In a network system, a propagated failure (PF) is a failure originating from a network component that can cause extensive damages to other network components or even the failure of the entire system. Existing works on PFs have mostly assumed the deterministic effect from a component PF, i.e., a fixed subset of system components is affected whenever the PF occurs. However, in many real-world systems, the components may have different levels of protection, and the effect of damage from a component PF can be dependent upon the status of other components within the same system or the occurrence order of component failures. This paper proposes a new analytical method based on multi-valued decision diagrams (MDDs) for the reliability analysis of network systems with dependent propagation effects. Particularly, new MDD modeling procedures are proposed for considering different types of dependent PF effects introduced by different protection levels. After the system MDD is generated using a new MDD combination algorithm to efficiently handle the dependent PF effects, methods for computing the network reliability and component importance measures are presented. The detailed analysis of an example network system subjected to dependent PFs is presented to illustrate the basics and application of the proposed method. It is shown that the proposed MDD-based method generates smaller model size and thus presents lower computational complexity in the model generation and evaluation than the existing Markov method and separable method.
INTRODUCTION
C OMPUTER networks provide a means of transmitting data from one computer to another. The loss of network services results in the failure of data transmission and processing, which can be costly and sometimes disastrous. When only local failures of network components are considered, redundancy techniques can be applied to mitigate the risk of unplanned outages and ensure continuity of operation by instantly responding to and reducing the effects of local failures.
Component redundancy can greatly reduce the network risks relating to local failures. However, propagated failures (PFs) such as those due to malicious attacks and computer virus infections, can propagate through the network and lead to a partial or overall network failure despite the presence of fault-tolerant mechanisms (adequate redundancies). In order to isolate a PF occurring in the network, i.e., transform it into a local failure, computers in a network are installed with protection mechanisms (e.g., firewall software, antivirus programs, access control security software). However, the protection mechanisms can fail or some obsolete legacy computers are not able to have up-to-date highlevel protection mechanisms. Hence, the spread of PFs still accounts for a significant share of the financial losses due to the computer security problems [1] , [2] , [3] .
As illustrated in Table 1 , computers in the network may have different levels of protection [4] , [5] . A computer with the highest protection level (i.e., level 3) has a perfect protection mechanism so that no PFs can be originating from the computer and it is not affected by PFs originating from other computers within the same network. A computer with the lowest protection level (i.e., level 0) is not protected at all or its protection mechanism is misconfigured or failed, thus it can have PFs and it can also be affected by PFs originating from other computers. The computers with protection level 1 or 2 have partially or out-of-date protection mechanisms, thus they either have PFs or can be affected by PFs originating from other computers according to the quality of their protection mechanisms; but not both.
As shown by many reliability studies, the presence of PFs can contribute greatly to the overall network unreliability [6] , [7] , [8] , [9] . Therefore, it is significant that PFs can be modeled appropriately in the network reliability analysis. Specifically, when all network computers have no protection mechanisms (i.e., in Level 0), a PF originating from one computer can affect all the components in the network directly or in a chain-effect manner, leading to the failure of the entire network. This phenomenon is known as PFs with global effects. Many researchers have studied PFs with global effects in the context of imperfect fault coverage. The existing methods include those such as state-space based methods where Markov, semi-Markov, non-homogeneous Markov, and extended stochastic Petri net models are used [10] , binary decision diagrams (BDDs)-based methods [11] , separable methods [12] , and universal generating function (UGF)-based methods [13] .
In more general cases, different levels of protections are considered. At these cases, a PF originating from a computer in level 0 or 1 can affect a subset of network components in level 0 and 2 instead of the whole network. This phenomenon is known as PFs with selective effects. The existing methods for handling them include UGF-based methods [14] , which are limited to series-parallel systems, and a separable approach [15] , which is a combinatorial method based on model decomposition and aggregation.
Existing studies on PFs have mostly assumed the deterministic effect from a PF, i.e., a fixed subset of computers is affected by the PF. However, this is not necessarily true when the used router is unreliable and will be failed with an unnegligible probability. The reason is that a computer network typically exhibits the functional dependence (FDEP) behavior, where computers connected to a router are functionally dependent on the router (referred to as a trigger component). If a PF originating from a computer C occurs after the failure of its router R, only computers that are locally connected to the same failed router R can be affected by this PF; computers that do not depend on the failed router R for their interconnection will still be working. In this case, the router failure happening before the PF actually reduces the effect of PFs. However, if the PF from computer C occurs before the failure of router R (or router R does not fail at all), the propagation effect takes place and the entire network is affected. Such PFs whose effects are dependent upon the status of other components within the same system or the occurrence order of component failures are known as PFs with dependent effects. The state-space based Markov methods can serve as a potential method to handle such dependent PFs, but they suffer from the statespace explosion problem and are typically limited to exponential time-to-failure distributions [16] , [17] . On the other hand, Bayesian networks (BNs) have become a widely used formalism for representing complex dependencies between random variables in probabilistic systems. Recently, their popularity started to grow among system reliability analysts. References [31] , [32] show that any static fault tree can be directly mapped into a BN. In the following inference process, the BN variables representing states of system components in a time slice are queried. When dependent propagated failures are considered, the BN formalism should be extended to dynamic Bayesian networks (DBNs) by providing an explicit discrete temporal dimension [33] . DBNs represent a probability distribution over the possible histories of a time-invariant process, thus they allow to represent more complex kinds of dependencies with respect to BN. The advantage of DBN with respect to state-space models like Markov chains is that they can deal with dependent propagated failures without running into the computational troubles because of the factorization into local dependencies of the whole state space [34] . Typically in a DBN, time slices are considered in order to model the system temporal evolution, and the granularity of time slice represents the tradeoff one is willing to make between the accuracy of results and the computation time. But the assumption of time invariance makes the DBN approach limited to exponential time-to-failure distributions, and the time discretization leads to some approximation of the results.
Recently, a separable approach based on total probability law was proposed for incorporating the dependent PFs into the system reliability analysis [18] .
The separable approaches in [15] , [18] follow the divideand-conquer paradigm, where a network reliability problem with selective PFs or dependent PFs is decomposed into reduced reliability problems based on occurrence of PFs, the status of trigger components and failure order of trigger and corresponding dependent components. Each reduced problem is then solved separately using BDDbased methods. However, the combinatorial approaches of [15] , [18] still do not take the full advantage of the decision diagram data structures on the sharing of isomorphic subdecision diagrams. Specifically, it is not necessary to use a separate BDD for each reduced reliability problem. Because the BDDs for different reduced reliability problems can share isomorphic sub-BDDs, it should be more efficient to generate and store only one instance of isomorphic subgraphs. Moreover, reliability engineers desperately need a more powerful modeling framework to avoid the large number of explicit decomposition and aggregation operations in the divide-and-conquer paradigm and make the analysis process neater and easier.
Multi-valued decision diagrams (MDDs) are efficient graph-based data structures for symbolic representation and manipulation of discrete Boolean or multi-valued logical functions on a set of multi-valued variables [19] . Their modeling power and advantages have been demonstrated for multi-state systems [20] , dynamic systems [21] and phased mission systems [22] , [23] . Compared with the traditional BDD-based approaches, these MDD-based methods generate smaller models using fewer independent multivalued variables, and thereby have lower computational complexity in the model generation and evaluation.
In this paper, we propose a new combinatorial method based on MDD for the reliability analysis of network systems subjected to dependent PFs. The method has no [15] , [18] , the proposed method generates a single compact decision diagram to model all the reduced reliability problems sharing their isomorphic sub-MDDs, improving both computational and storage efficiency. As an extension of the system model considered in [18] , different levels of protection are also considered and new MDD modeling procedures are proposed for different types of dependent propagated failure effects. After the system MDD is generated by using a new MDD combination algorithm to deal with the dependent PF effects efficiently, both reliability and component importance analysis are performed. Computational efficiency of the proposed MDDbased method is compared with that of the existing Markov method [16] , [17] and separable method [15] , [18] . The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. System description and reliability modeling together with an example of a network system are given in Section 2. In Section 3, different types of PFs are modeled using MDD, and an efficient generation procedure is proposed to construct a single compact shared MDD model for the entire system. The analysis procedures are proposed to calculate network unreliability and component importance measures in Section 4. Section 5 gives an illustration of our method through detailed analyses of the example network system. Finally, in Section 6, we present our conclusions, as well as directions for future work.
EXAMPLE SYSTEM

System Description
A fault-tolerant network system is designed to help make tangible the type of systems for which the proposed approach is meant. Fig. 2 illustrates the example wide area network (WAN) system consisting of three local area networks (LANs). For applications with high reliability requirement, network redundancy is used to reduce the effect of local failures of network components. Both WAN and LANs are configured in a triple modular redundant manner. The entire network system is functioning as long as at least two out of three LANs can work and communicate with each other. Each LAN consists of three computers and is functioning as long as at least two out of the three computers are working. All components are not repairable, and failures of different computers are s-independent.
Each computer can access computers in other LANs via Internet through the router of the LAN to which the computer belongs. In other words, all computers in the same LAN are functionally dependent on the router of the LAN; the router is the trigger component, and the computers are the dependent components. The routers normally have perfect protections and they do not originate PFs or are affected by PFs. In this example network system, for illustration purpose, a single legacy router R 1 is assumed, which is unreliable and can fail with a non-negligible probability; the other two up-to-date routers (R 2 and R 3 ) are assumed to be perfectly reliable. All computers have local failures. A computer may have PF depending on which protection level it has. The local failure and PF of a computer are mutually exclusive. We consider following scenarios to illustrate our proposed methodology: 1) Scenario 1. Computer C 1 has level 1 protection, and computers C 4 and C 7 have level 2 protection. Thus, C 1 can originate PF but is not affected by PFs from other computers, while C 4 and C 7 can only be affected by PFs originating from C 1 . 2) Scenario 2. Computer C 1 has level 1 protection, and computers C 4 and C 7 have level 0 protection. Thus, C 4 and C 7 can be affected by PFs originating from C 1 and they also can affect each other. 3) Scenario 3. Computers C 1 , C 4 and C 7 are all in level 0 protection, i.e., they can affect each other.
Reliability Modeling Using DFT
Fault trees are logic block diagrams that display the state of a system in terms of the states of its components. It uses a graphic "model" of the pathways within a system that can lead to a foreseeable, undesirable loss event (or a failure). Thus, they can easily provide a concise representation of failure behavior, and hence has been supported by a rich body of research since 1960s. Later on dynamic fault trees (DFT) were introduced by Dugan et al. [24] to specify some dynamic behavior of system failure mechanisms through dynamic gates.
To facilitate the representation of PF in the DFT, we propose a new gate called the PF gate. Similar to the functional dependency gate [24] , the PF gate has a single trigger input, a non-dependent output reflecting the status of the input trigger event, and one or more dependent events. The difference between the traditional FDEP gate and the proposed PF gate is that the component appearing as a trigger input of a PF gate can experience a propagated failure and it is this propagated failure that causes the dependent components fail, while the trigger input of a traditional FDEP gate typically represents a component local failure event or even a logic combination of multiple component local failure events that causes the dependent components to become unusable or inaccessible.
With the PF gate we can model different protection levels described in Table 1 : 1) If a computer C is both a trigger of one PF gate and a dependent input of another PF gate, it has level 0 protection; 2) If C appears only as a trigger of one PF, it has level 1 protection; 3) If C appears only as a dependent input of one PF, it has level 2 protection; 4) If C is not associated with any PF gates, it has level 3 protection.
The top-layer DFT model of the example system under the three scenarios is illustrated in Fig. 3a , where the functional dependence relationship between the unreliable router R 1 and its dependent computers (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 ) is modeled using an FDEP gate. Note that since R 2 and R 3 are assumed to be perfectly reliable, no FEDP gates are needed to model the functional dependence relationship between them and their corresponding dependent computers. Figs. 3b to 3d illustrate the modeling of PFs under the three scenarios. Specifically, in Figs. 3b and 3c, computer C 1 only appears as a trigger of one PF gate, thus it is in level 1 protection. In Fig. 3b , computers C 4 and C 7 only appear as a dependent input of one PF gate, thus they are in level 2 protection. The computer C 1 in Fig. 3d , and computers C 4 and C 7 in Fig. 3c and 3d appear simultaneously as a trigger of one PF gate and as a dependent input of another PF gate, thus they are in level 0 protection. Other computers (C 2 , C 3 , C 5 , C 6 , C 8 , and C 9 ) which are not associated with any PF gates are in level 3 protection.
SYSTEM MODELING USING MDD
In this section, we adapt MDDs for the system modeling of network systems subject to PFs. Unlike the separable approaches that generate multiple decision diagrams, the proposed method uses multi-valued variables to express the dependent propagation effects and generates a single compact MDD. Below we describe in detail how to model dependent propagation effects and further the failure behavior of the entire system with MDDs.
PF Modeling Using MDD
Before the generation of the final MDD to model the whole network system subject to PFs, variables encoding different types of PFs should be defined. To encode or model the PFs in a network system by means of an MDD, we consider the following cases.
Case 1: PFs of Computers in Level 1 Protection Connected to Unreliable Routers
If the dependent computers of an unreliable router R can originate PFs, the router R is involved in dependent propagation effect. Let m denote the number of dependent computers in level 1 protection with PFs, and S denote the event space related to this dependent propagation effect. Consider Scenario 1 where router R 1 is unreliable and it has only one dependent computer C 1 in level 1 protection. i.e., m ¼ 1. The event space S has four events:
PF C1 " (nonoccurrence of R 1 failure and nonoccurrence of PF from C 1 ),
" (nonoccurrence of R 1 failure and occurrence of PF from C 1 ),
(the failure of R 1 occurs but PF from C 1 does not occur before it), E 3 ¼ "PF C1 ! R 1 " (PF originating from C 1 occurs before R 1 failure).
The consequence of each event is listed in Table 2 . Using the constructed event space, the dependent propagation effect can be represented with a four-valued variable PF. Fig. 4 shows the MDD model. There are 4 outgoing edges: the ith-edge represents event E i . As described in Section 3.2, the MDD modeling PFs will be combined with the BDD model of the static part of DFT using logic 'AND' operation to generate the entire system model considering the different dependent PF effects. Thus, all the four outgoing edges are connected to sink node '1'.
In general, when m > 1, the event space consists of all possible combinations and sequences of occurrence or nonoccurrence of the router failure and the m PFs. The space S can be divided into m þ 2 disjoint subspaces S 0 ; S 1 ; . . . ; S mþ1 . For each event in S 0 , the router failure never occurs. Thus, S 0 has 2 m possible combinations of m PFs occurring. S mþ1 contains only one event representing that the failure of the router occurs but no PFs occur before the router failure. The events in S i (1 i m) represent i PFs occur before the router failure. Thus, S i has C(m, i) possible combinations of i out of m PFs occurring. Using the constructed event space, the dependent propagation effect can be represented with a j S j -valued variable PF. Note that if all the m PFs have global effect, any single PF can affect all the components in the network and lead to the failure of the entire network. Thus, we will not have such a case where two or more than two global PFs happen together. In other words, we assume the occurrence probability of more than one PF with global effect is zero. Then, S 0 has m possible events and each represents a PF occurs while the router failure never occurs; S 1 has m possible events and each represents a PF occurs before the router failure; S mþ1 contains only one event representing that the failure of the router occurs but no PFs occur before the router failure; and S j (2 j m) are empty sets. Finally, the constructed event space has 2m þ 1 events, the dependent propagation effect can be represented with a 2m þ 1-valued variable PF.
Case 2: PFs of Computers in Level 0 Protection Connected to Reliable Routers
When there are more than one computer having PFs and they can affect each other, we use a group G to denote them. The PF of any computer in group G causes the whole group to fail. Consider Scenario 2 where two computers C 4 and C 7 in level 0 protection are connected to reliable routers R 2 and R 3 . Thus, G ¼ fC 4 ; C 7 g and we have three events. E 0 ¼ " : PF C4^: PF C7 " (no PF occurs).
: PF C7 ! PF C4 " (PF originating from C 4 occurs first). E 2 ¼ " : PF C4 ! PF C7 " (PF originating from C 7 occurs first).
The consequence of each event is listed in Table 3 . E 1 and E 2 have same subsequence, so the dependent propagation effect can be represented with a binary-valued variable PF. Fig. 5 shows the MDD model. There are two outgoing edges: the 0-edge for event E 0 represents "no PF occurs"; the one-edge for the disjunctive combination of events E 1 and E 2 , i.e., E 1 _ E 2 , represents "one PF occurs first".
In general, when group G in level 0 protection has m computers, the dependent propagation effect still can be represented with a binary-valued variable PF since PFs originating from any computer within the group can affect all the others.
Case 3: PFs of Computers in Level 0 Protection Connected to Unreliable Routers
If computers in level 0 protection are connected to unreliable routers, these routers should be added to group G. Consider Scenario 3 where computers C 1 , C 4 and C 7 in level 0 protection can affect each other, and C 1 is connected to an unreliable router R 1 . Thus, G ¼ fC 1 ; C 4 ; C 7 ; R 1 g. Let S denote the event space related to this dependent propagation effect. Here, we can construct the event space S by backtracking on the consequences as shown in Table 4 .
As shown in Table 4 , the consequences can be classified into four categories, so the dependent propagation effect can be represented with a four-valued variable PF. Fig. 6 shows the MDD model. There are four outgoing edges. 0-edge for event E 0 represents "no failure occurs"; one-edge for the disjunctive combination of events E 1, E 2 and E 3 , i.e., E 1 _ E 2 _ E 3 , leads to the failure of C 1 , C 4 and C 7 ; two-edge for event E 4 leads to the failure of R 1 , C 1 , C 2 and C 3 ; three-edge for the disjunctive combination of events E 5, E 6 and E 7 , i.e., E 5 _ E 6 _ E 7 , leads to the failure of R 1 , C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , C 4 and C 7 .
Note that, Scenario 1 and Scenario 3 have the MDD models in the same form as shown in Figs. 4 and 6 , but the physical meanings associated with four outgoing edges are different.
System MDD Construction
In this work, the system MDD model is constructed using following three-step process. 1) By traversing the dynamic part of the given DFT model, i.e., PF gates and FDEP gates, identify all dependent propagation effects based on these dynamic gates, and model these effects using MDD based on the discussion in Section 3.1. 2) By traversing the static part of the given DFT, construct a BDD model using the traditional method in [25] . 3) Obtain the final system MDD by combining the decision diagrams models obtained in steps 1&2 using logic operation 'AND'. Note that during the combination, the variables of m PFs, i.e., PF 1 ; PF 2 ; . . . ; PF m , are ordered before the variables of n computers, i.e., C 1 , C 2 , . . ., C n . Next we present how to perform the MDD combination in step 3) correctly and efficiently. Consider two MDDs E and F, respectively rooted at variables X and Y in the following case format:
The traditional manipulation rules for the logic operation Å (i.e., OR or AND) between E and F are [19] , [20] :
orderðXÞ < orderðY Þ caseðY; E Å F 0 ; . . . ;E Å F n Þ orderðXÞ > orderðY Þ:
The same rules are recursively applied for logic operations between sub-MDDs till one of them becomes sink node 0 or 1. However, if we construct the MDD model for the considered systems subject to dependent PF using the traditional manipulation rules of (1), the resultant MDD might contain some unreasonable nodes. As an illustration, consider Scenario 1. Fig. 7 shows the system MDD generated using the manipulation rules of (1), which contains the following unreasonable nodes: 1) MDD nodes C 4 and C 7 appearing in the one-edge sub-MDD of node PF are invalid. Given that the PF originating from computer C 1 occurs and router R 1 keeps working (represented by one-edge of MDD node PF), computers C 4 and C 7 are both affected and fail; they cannot be in the operational state at all. 2) MDD nodes C 2 and C 3 appearing in the two-edge sub-MDD of node PF are invalid. Given that the failure of router R 1 occurs before the PF originating from computer C 1 (represented by two-edge of MDD node PF), computers C 2 and C 3 are both affected and thus fail; they cannot be in the operational state at all. 3) MDD nodes C 2 , C 3 , C 4 and C 7 appearing in the threeedge sub-MDD of node PF are invalid. Given that the PF originating from computer C 1 occurs before the failure of router R 1 (represented by three-edge of MDD node R 1 ), computers C 2 , C 3 , C 4 and C 7 cannot be in the operational state at all. As shown in Table 5 , we modify the operational rules of (1) by introducing a queue data structure Q, which is used to deal with the dependent propagation effects during the MDD combination. The upper bound of the queue's length is the total number of computers involved in PF effects, so the needed storage is much less compared to the MDD size. Specifically, Q is operated using the following principle: 1) Before generating the jth-edge sub-MDD of MDD node PF, all computers affected by the router failures or propagated failures associated with jth-edge are stored in Q (line 10 in Table 5 ). Consider Scenario 1. Computers C 4 and C 7 are stored in Q to generate the one-edge sub-MDD (one-edge means "PF occurs"); Computers C 2 and C 3 are stored in Q to generate the two-edge sub-MDD (two-edge means "router R 1 fails"); Computers C 2 , C 3 , C 4 and C 7 are stored in Q to generate the three-edge sub-MDD (three-edge means "PF occurs before the failure of router R 1 "). When the jth-edge sub-MDD generation is finished, these added computers are deleted from Q (line 13 in Table 5 ). 2) When a computer C currently processed is in the failure state, i.e., it is already included in Q, new MDD node C will not be constructed (line 7 in Table 5 ). Based on the Q data structure, the correct system MDD model can be generated without any unreasonable nodes.
RELIABILITY ANALYSIS USING MDD
After generating the MDD model, various reliability measures can be obtained by evaluating the resultant MDD. Below we describe in detail how to calculate the probability associated with each edge in MDD model, and then how to compute the network reliability and component importance measures based on the calculated edge probabilities and the system MDD model.
Calculation of Edge Probability
It is assumed that the cumulative failure distribution, F(t), of the network components and related parameters are known. The following three cases are considered for the edge probability calculation.
1) For node C, which represents a computer C not involving in PF in the network: its one-edge is associated with the failure probability of computer C, that is, F C ðtÞ; its 0-edge is associated with the operation probability of computer C, that is, 1 À F C ðtÞ. 2) For node C, which represents a computer C with PF in the network: its one-edge is associated with the occurrence probability of local failure given that its PF does not occur, that is, LF C ðtÞ=ð1 À PF C ðtÞÞ; its 0-edge is associated with the operation probability of C given its PF does not occur, that is, ð1À PF C ðtÞ À LF C ðtÞÞ=ð1 À PF C ðtÞÞ. 3) For node PF, which represents the dependent propagation effect as discussed in Section 3.1, the event relating to an outgoing edge is in a form of "X ! Y", "X^Y", "X _ Y", or their combinations, where X ¼ E i or:E i ; Y ¼ E j or :E j . Note that events E i and E j represent the local or propagated failures of a single computer or router. In general, the occurrence probability of n s-independent sequential failure events can be computed as
where f Ek ðtÞ is the probability density function of the timeto-failure associated with E k . The occurrence probability of n s-independent conjunctive failure events can be computed as
The occurrence probability of n s-independent disjunctive failure events can be computed as
As an illustration, assume each failure event E follows an exponential distribution with parameter E . The cumulative distribution function F ðt; E Þ is given by
The occurrence probability of "E 1 ! E 2 ", " : E 1 ! E 2 ", "E 1^E2 ", and "E 1 _ E 2 " relating to two exponentially distributed failure events E 1 and E 2 can be computed as follows:
Calculation of Network Unreliability
In the generated MDD, the probability of each path is simply the product of the probability of each edge appearing on the path. Since all the paths are disjoint, the probability of the entire network failure (i.e., the unreliability of the entire network) is thus given by the sum of probabilities for all the paths from the root to sink node 1.
. . . ; G x¼s Þ. Because all sub-expressions ðx ¼ iÞ Ã ðG x¼i Þ are disjoint, the network unreliability UN can be computed more compactly via a recursive algorithm.
where Pr{G x¼i ¼ 1} is the probability with respect to the current sub-MDD G x¼i. If x is the root node of the entire MDD, then Pr{G ¼ 1} gives the final network unreliability:
Calculation of Component Importance Measures
In addition to calculating the failure probability of the whole network system, it is often necessary to perform component importance analysis that identifies which components contribute the most to system failure or performance and thus would be good candidates for upgrade. In this work based on the MDD model, we implement the component importance analysis for local failure using Birnbaum's measure [26] , [27] . The Birnbaum's measure of computer C, B C , is defined as the partial derivative of the network unreliability UN with respect to the local failure probability of computer C denoted by LF C , that is, B C ¼ @UN=@LF C . It can be evaluated recursively and concurrently with UN during the traversal of the MDD model. The detailed description of this recursive calculation can be found in [8] .
EXAMPLE ANALYSIS
System MDD Construction
Consider the example network system described in Section 2.1. Using the modeling method described in Section 3.2, Table 6 gives MDD models for the dependent propagation effects in the three scenarios. Applying the traditional BDD method of [25] on the static part of the given DFT in Fig. 3 , we obtain the BDD model as shown in Fig. 8 . (Table 6 ) and BDD of the static part (Fig. 8 ) using logic operation 'AND', we obtain the final system MDD for the three scenarios as shown in Fig. 9 (Scenarios 1 & 3) and Fig. 10 (Scenario 2) .
By combining the MDDs for PFs
For the example system, Scenarios 1 and 3 happen to have the final system MDD models in the same form as they share the same MDD models of PFs with the similar subsequence for each edge. However, the meaning and probability of each edge are different. The correctness of the model in Fig. 9 can be easily verified. For example, under scenario 1, the 0-edge represents "
: R 1^: PF C1 ", thus C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , C 4 , and C 7 appear in the sub-MDD. The one-edge represents "
: R 1^P F C1 ", thus C 1 , C 4 , and C 7 do not appear in the sub-MDD. The two-edge represents "
: PF C1 ! R 1 ", thus C 1 , C 2 , and C 3 do not appear in the sub-MDD. The three-edge represents "PF C1 ! R 1 ", thus all C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , C 4 , and C 7 do not appear in the sub-MDD. The system MDD model for Scenario 2 as shown in Fig. 10 has two independent PF variables PF 1 and PF 2 .
To validate the correctness and efficiency of the proposed MDD-based approach, we also analyze the example system in Section 2.1 using the traditional Markov-based method where a Markov model consisting of N ¼ 129 states must be solved. Note that the example system under the different scenarios has Markov models with the same size but different state transitions. Consider a binary-state system with L components. The computational complexity of the Markov method is O(k Ã w) where k ¼ OðL 2 Þ is the number of steps involved in the Markov solution for reaching equilibrium for acyclic Markov chains, w ¼ Oðm 3 Þ represents the time complexity at each step and m ¼ Oð2 L Þ represents the number of system states [16] , [17] . Note that in our MDD-based method Fig. 8 . The generated BDD from the static part of the given DFT in Fig. 3 . we only need to solve a combinatorial MDD model having 23 (Scenarios 1&3) or 29 (Scenario 2) non-terminal nodes, and the complexity of the MDD model evaluation algorithm is proportional to the number of nodes in the system model as stated in Section 4.2. Moreover, the proposed method has no limitation on the type of time-to-failure distributions for the system components while the Markov-based approach is typically limited to the exponential time-to-failure distribution. On the other hand, when the DFT models of Scenarios 1, 2, and 3 are analyzed using the traditional separable method in [15] , [18] , 4, 6, and 4 separate decision diagrams are constructed respectively with totally 36, 50, and 36 non-terminal nodes, while the single compact MDD model constructed in the proposed method can model all the reduced reliability problems sharing their isomorphic sub-decision-diagrams, improving both computational and storage efficiency.
Reliability Evaluation Based on MDD Model
Assume the mission time is T ¼ 1000 hours and all component failure times follow exponential distributions with parameter . Table 7 shows the component failure rates and corresponding failure probabilities (calculated as 1-exp (À Ã T)) used in the analysis. First we consider Scenario 1. The edge probabilities of top MDD node PF can be calculated as follows:
The unreliability of Scenario 1, UN PF , can be obtained by evaluating the MDD in Fig. 9 as
Without considering the PF originating from C 1 , the decision diagram model becomes a BDD model. Using the traditional BDD generation algorithm [25] , we obtain the system BDD for the example network without considering PF as shown in Fig. 11 . By evaluating the BDD in Fig. 11 , it can be found that the network unreliability, UN :PF , is improved to
Apparently, failure to consider the dependent PFs leads to underestimated system unreliability. In other words, the presence of dependent PFs can contribute significantly to the overall unreliability of network systems. Using the parameter values of Table 7, Table 8 gives the network unreliability for the three scenarios as well as the percentage of underestimation in comparison to the case without considering PFs calculated using (UN PF À UN :PF )/UN :PF .
We also study the effect of different PF probabilities on the network unreliability. For example, using different values of PFC1 and thus different PF probability of computer C 1 , PF C1 ¼ 1-expð-PFC1 Ã T Þ, we calculate the network unreliability under Scenario 1 and summarize the results in Table 9 . It can be observed that 1) when PFC1 is less than 10 -6 , the presence of dependent PF contribute slightly to the overall network unreliability; 2) when 10
À5
PFC1 10
À3 , the presence of dependent PF contribute significantly to the overall network unreliability; 3) when PFC1 is larger than 10
À3
, the overall network unreliability does not significantly deteriorate with the increase of PFC1.
Based on the proposed MDD-based methodology, we can also study the effect of different trigger failure probabilities on network unreliability given a fixed PF probability. Again, use Scenario 1 as an example for illustration. By using different exponential distribution parameter R1 of trigger failure probability F R1 , we calculate the network unreliability under three cases: UN :PF (without considering the PF originating from C 1 ) and UN PF under two different PF probability distribution parameter PFC1 . As shown in Table 10 , when R1 is large enough, the overall unreliability of network systems will not significantly deteriorate due to the presence of PFs because the effect of the router failure dominates.
Based on discussions in Section 4.3, we perform component importance analysis for nine computers. When no PF is considered and LF for nine computers are the same:
LF ¼ 2 Ã 10 À5 , the importance values for all the computers calculated from the BDD model in Fig. 11 are identical and they are 0.091669, meaning that they are equally important.
When Scenario 1 is considered, the MDD model in Fig. 9 is evaluated. Based on the importance analysis results collected in Table 11 , the new importance values of computers C 2 , C 3 , C 5 , C 6 , C 8 , and C 9 are increased while the importance values of computers C 4 and C 7 are decreased. This can be explained by the fact that when the PF is introduced, C 4 and C 7 affected by the PF originating from C 1 do not appear in the system structure function, while C 2 , C 3 , C 5 , C 6 , C 8 , and C 9 will contribute more to the system failure because the system structure of these LANs is changed from a two-out-of-three model to a less reliable one-out-of-two model (i.e., logic OR). Using these importance results, the analyst can identify computer(s) that contribute the most to the network unreliability, which could be good candidate(s) for upgrade. From Table 11 , we observe that computers that have the largest importance value change with values of LFC1 and PFC1 . When PFC1 ¼ 10 À5 and LFC1 ¼ 10 À5 computers C 5 , C 6 , C 8 , and C 9 are the best candidates for improving the system reliability of the sample network system. However, for the other two configurations of LFC1 and PFC1 , computers C 2 and C 3 have the largest importance values and thus are the best candidates for upgrade.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, a new MDD-based analysis technique is proposed for computing the reliability of network systems subjected to dependent propagated failure effects. New PF modeling using MDDs as well as system MDD generation and evaluation procedures are presented to consider different levels of protection existing in the considered systems as well as the dependent propagated failure effects. The method is combinatorial and has no limitation on the types of component time-to-failure distributions. As compared to the existing Markov and separable methods, we show that the proposed MDD-based method generates smaller model size, and has lower computational complexity in both model generation and evaluation. Though the method is presented and illustrated in the context of network systems, it can be applicable to other types of systems that exhibit behavior of functional dependence and dependent failure propagation effects.
In this work, we have assumed the propagation time of PFs is negligible compared with the mission time, i.e., the failure propagation is instantaneous. Hence, the cascading PFs, for example "A affects B, B affects C" can be treated as "A affects both B and C", thus can be automatically solved with our method. In the future we will consider s-dependent failures by combining with the Markov methods in [29] , [30] , and the time-delay effect of the failure propagation [13] , [28] where propagation time and mission time have similar order of magnitude.
Though our proposed method can consider multiple failure modes (i.e., local failure and propagated failure), it is not directly applicable to handling general multi-state behavior where the system component can assume multiple performance levels or states ranging from perfect function to complete failure. For example, the failure of one component of the system can induce some degraded functioning states in adjacent components. Moreover, when the number of dependent components increases, solving the integral equation of (2) runs into the computational trouble. As shown in [33] , [34] , the DBN approach is a potential powerful solution to address multi-state variables and computational problems. Therefore, another direction of our future work is to explore the integration of the DBN model into our proposed MDD framework to address these issues.
